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The voluminous literature on foreign exchange interventions has traditionally 
focused on advanced economies (Dominguez and Frankel, 1990, Leahy, 1995, 
Dominguez, 1998, 2006, Dominguez et al, 2013, Chang and Taylor, 1998, Humpage, 
1999, 2003, Baillie et al, 2000, Bordo et al, 2012a, 012b, Ito, 2005, Ito and Yabu, 
2007, Fatum and Hutchison, 2002, 2003, 2006, Kearns nd Rigobon, 2005, Fatum, 
2008, and Neely, 2011). Nevertheless, in recent years the empirical stylized facts of 
foreign exchange interventions have changed in several important ways. Major 
central banks in advanced economies, particularly those in the G7, have intervened 
less frequently post-1996.1 On the other hand, many central banks in emerging 
markets, especially in Asia, have experienced large balance sheet expansions 
through the accumulation of foreign reserves and accompanied by more frequent 
foreign exchange interventions. Cook and Yetman (2012) document that the asset 
expansions in Asian central banks’ balance sheets have been caused by a build-up of 
foreign exchange reserves.2 Although we have witnessed a recent rising trend of 
central bank engagement in competitive exchange rate management in emerging 
markets, evidence of intervention efficacy remains sparse.  
This paper is the first to demonstrate the use of Reuters’ news reports as a 
proxy for Asian central bank interventions, providing a contribution to empirically 
determine whether such interventions are effective using data from January 2005 to 
November 2013. This sample period is chosen because there are extensive 
                                                      
1 Neely (2011) highlights the mid-1990s as the start of the post-intervention era. Authorities of 
developed countries doubted of the efficacy of foreign exchange intervention operations and stopped 
intervening or intervened less frequently in the foreign exchange market. For example, the Bank of 
Canada stopped intervening in 1988, while the European Central Bank has intervened very rarely 
since 1999. In addition, central banks over times have turned to inflation targeting rather than 
exchange rate targeting as a framework for monetary policy. 
2
 Foreign exchange reserves made up more than 80% of central bank assets for eight Asian countries, 
comprising China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand. 
While Indonesia may be the only exception, its foreign reserves have constituted more than half of 















intervention reports on currency markets by Asian ce tral banks that coincide with 
the global credit crisis and U.S. quantitative easing. International funds have rapidly 
flowed in and out of Asian countries, giving rise to large fluctuations of Asian 
currencies during that period. In addition, the stronger external drivers driven by 
prolonged low interest rates in developed economies combined with excess global 
liquidity arising from quantitative easing measures have amplified short-term 
portfolio flows into Asian economies seeking higher r turns. The influx of capital 
flows into Asian economies inadvertently impact on the respective country exchange 
rates. This study seeks to study (1) whether central bank’s foreign exchange 
interventions were successful in Asian countries during the period of unconventional 
monetary policy in advanced economies, for which large capital inflow has resulted 
in appreciation pressure on the respective countries currencies; (2) what factors 
determine the central bank to intervene in the foreign xchange market; and (3) what 
intervention strategies were found to increase the odds of successful intervention.    
There is a large body of work that has focused on rationalizing the causes and 
consequences of foreign currency reserve build-up in emerging Asian economies 
especially since 1998 (Bird and Rajan 2003, Aizenma and Marion, 2003). These 
studies have concluded that Asia holds more than enough reserves as a financial 
safeguard, and that this sustained reserve build-up has been motivated by a desire to 
keep currencies from appreciating significantly. In an effort to shield the domestic 
financial system from volatile capital in- and outflows, many Asian economies 
central banks have massively accumulated reserves.3 In addition, during the global 
financial crisis, part of the large influx of international funds into Asia has been 
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 The main reasons for holding reserves are the need to service government’s foreign debt, to provide 
the option to intervene in the foreign exchange market for maintaining orderly market and to provide 















driven by the U.S. Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing policy to stimulate the U.S. 
economy after the global credit crisis, which resulted in a long-term downward trend 
of the US dollar viz-á-viz Asian currencies. In the face of appreciation pressure on 
their currencies, several Asian central banks have frequently intervened in the 
foreign exchange market to stabilize their exchange rat s with a view of promoting 
and maintaining their export competitiveness. This paper fills an important gap in 
the literature on foreign exchange intervention in Asian markets for reasons that (1) 
studies on Asian foreign exchange intervention is scarce due to intervention data 
paucity, and (2) the period that we examined coincides with unconventional 
monetary policy which has never occurred in the past and on that basis it presents an 
opportunity to study a plethora of Asian economies with different exchange rate 
systems.  
This paper uses the analytical framework of Humpage (1999) who shows that 
the U.S. intervention against German Deutsche Mark and Japanese Yen has the 
ability to influence exchange rate movements under a weak 
leaning-against-the-wind criterion.4  This framework bodes well with the 
coordination channel of intervention in that intervention might be important in 
coordinating the expectations of market participants. Sarno and Taylor (2001), 
Taylor (2005), and Reitz and Taylor (2008) emphasizes the importance of this 
coordination channel in communicating the authorities’ belief that the exchange rate 
is deviating substantially from its long-run value. In light of the appreciating Asian 
currencies against the US dollar recently, many authorities believe that this undue 
appreciation pressure does not reflect the true extrnal value of their currencies, thus 
                                                      
4
 Humpage (1999) refers to the predictive power of intervention as forecast value, which are defined 















potentially hurting their exports.5  
Following Fatum and Hutchison (2002), we use news repo ts on Asian central 
banks’ interventions to analyze the effectiveness of exchange rate management by 
central banks in India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philipp nes, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. The method of Humpage (1999) also permits the success of 
intervention operations, as proxied via these news reports to be judged within a 
probabilistic framework. This probabilistic framework squares well with the element 
of market psychology in the operation of the coordination channel, because it relies 
on traders recognizing the authorities’ interventio perations as a coordinating 
effort implied by such intervention news. Evidence, supporting the coordination 
channel, leads to the probability of intervention success to be represented as an 
increasing function of the degree of intervention.  
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, there is a strong correlation 
between Reuters’ intervention reports and the changes of exchange rates for all eight 
Asian countries. In particular, firm intervention reports in the period post-2008 
appeared to have increased following the adoption of unconventional monetary 
policy in advanced economies. Second, there is evidence that most Asian countries, 
with the exception of Indonesia and India, are purchasing USD as part of their 
intervention strategies to counter the pressure of rising external value of domestic 
currency caused by unconventional monetary policy in advanced economies.6 It was 
found that their learning-against-the-wind interventio  policy was successful in 
                                                      
5
 There is also the traditional portfolio balance approach to exchange rate determination. The 
portfolio-balance channel explores the impact of changes in relative supply of domestic (change in 
the quantity of publicly held government debt) and foreign assets due to the intervention operations 
(Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). This approach suffers from data paucity; the data on domestic and 
foreign assets are, more often than not, available t annual frequency thus restricting the analysis of 
exchange rate intervention at the daily level.   
6 Most trades around the world are invoiced in US dollar. Table A1 of Casas et al. (2016) shows that in 
all of the countries examined in this study, which are reported in Table A1, their trades are invoiced in 
















reducing the speed with which exchange rates are appreciating. Third, when 
controlling for factors that explain the effectiveness of intervention by Asian central 
banks, we find that the odds of successful intervention are both statistically and 
economically influenced by the presence of joint/coordinated interventions and 
first-day interventions. Official statement of support also wields a significant effect 
on increasing the success of intervention. Finally, there is evidence to suggest that 
central banks intervene during the credit crisis period to calm disorderly market. It is 
important to recognize that while the evidence presented here is built on the premise 
of the accuracy of Reuters news reports of actual interventions, we can be confident 
that given the conservative estimates of newswire reports as a proxy for actual 
interventions, these results may underestimate the str ngth of the underlying 
relationships between variables. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a 
literature review focusing on intervention channels, studies conducted on both 
developed and developing countries, and the recent intervention experience of seven 
Asian economies examined in this study during unconventional monetary policy in 
advanced economies. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the 
methodology and provides the empirical results. Section 5 concludes and discusses 
the implications of our results. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Intervention channels 
Official intervention in the foreign exchange market occurs when central bank 
authorities buy or sell the US dollar, normally against their own currencies, in order 















which official intervention might affect the foreign exchange market indirectly: the 
portfolio balance channel, the signaling channel, and the coordination channel. 
The portfolio balance channel alludes to sterilized intervention changing the 
relative supplies of bonds denominated in different currencies. Given that bonds from 
different countries are imperfect substitutes and that raders’ demand for bonds from a 
particular country is determined by their given rate of return, then the relative returns 
on certain bonds depend on the relative quantities of those bonds to other 
currency-denominated bonds. Researchers, however, are skeptical that the portfolio 
balance channel can explain the effectiveness of interventions, because interventions 
are usually way too small to significantly change th  relative quantities of bonds 
(Humpage, 1999). Nevertheless, Galati and Melick (2002) argue that the portfolio 
channel may be more relevant for emerging markets bcause they are more likely to 
have large reserve portfolios relative to local foreign exchange market turnover or the 
stock of domestic bonds outstanding. Moreover, given that the degree of 
substitutability between emerging market currency debt and foreign currency debt is 
generally smaller - as reflected in higher risk premia on the former - the portfolio 
balance effect may also be stronger in these countries. For this reason, while it may 
seem appropriate to study the effectiveness of foreign xchange intervention within 
the framework of portfolio balance channel, data paucity and the low frequency of 
available data tend to render the analysis restrictive. 
The signaling channel suggests that official intervention signals information 
about future monetary policy. The literature on intervention has not been favourable 
toward this channel. Using bivariate vector autoregressions and Granger causality 
tests, Lewis (1995) has examined whether intervention helps predict future changes 















signaling story and finds a circular relationship between intervention and future 
monetary policy. Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) have also reported similar results, 
which indicate that the US intervention provided a signal to future changes in 
interbank rates and monetary aggregates, but sometimes in the opposite direction of 
that predicted by the conventional signaling hypothesis. On the other hand, Fatum 
and Hutchison (1999) fail to find that intervention exerts any effect on federal funds 
future rates. More importantly, the plausibility ofthe signaling story is in doubt, 
given that both monetary policy and exchange rate policy are generally managed by 
two different institutions in an economy. For example, the U.S. Treasury is 
responsible for the value of the USD and it is unlikely that its intervention signal 
would communicate anticipated monetary policy decidd by the FOMC. It has been 
argued that the signaling channel is likely to be waker in emerging market 
countries since central banks in these economies have a shorter history of 
institutional and policy credibility than their counterparts in developed economies 
(BIS, 2005). 
The coordination channel, which is the most plausible channel of the three, 
suggests that intervention might be important in coordinating the expectations of 
market participants. This channel has received increasingly greater importance in the 
literature, because intervention communicates the authorities’ belief about the 
exchange rate being misaligned from its long-run value. During such periods, 
individual traders are subject to greater risk if they invest capital in hopes of a return 
to the long-run equilibrium even though the exchange rate can persist to deviate 
from its long-run equilibrium level for an extended time period. Be that as it may, 
foreign exchange intervention can facilitate the convergence in the expectations of 















long-run equilibrium. It is this channel that we draw upon in this study for assessing 
the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention.   
2.2 Developed and developing markets 
Over the years, there have been radical changes in the conduct of foreign 
exchange intervention. The U.S. monetary authorities used foreign exchange 
intervention to counter disorderly market conditions i  1980, although interventions 
became less frequent by the late-1990. Empirical works on the effectiveness of 
intervention have produced very mixed results and generally rely on data from 
developed countries, specifically the G7 countries (Dominguez and Frankel, 1990, 
Dominguez, 1998, Humpage, 1999, Fatum and Hutchison, 2002, 2003, 2006, Kearns 
and Rigobon, 2005). Dominguez and Frankel (1990) show that central bank 
interventions in Germany and the U.S. are effective in influencing exchange rate 
volatilities. Dominguez (1998) also presents that interventions by the U.S., Germany, 
and Japan tend to increase exchange rate volatilities during the 1977-1994 period. 
Humpage (1999) notes that intervention possesses some forecast value when the U.S. 
Treasury undertakes a weak leaning-against-the-wind policy.  
The study of Fatum and Hutchison (2002) is the closest to ours in the sense that 
they utilize news reports from the Wall Street Journal to investigate the effects of 
intervention news on the Euro. Using four different ca egories of intervention news 
of the European Central Bank (ECB), they find that official statements denying ECB 
intervention or news that question the efficacy of intervention do have a significant 
and negative impact on the value of the Euro. On the other hand, firm reports of 
intervention, as well as rumors and speculation of i tervention in support of the Euro 
lead to short-term Euro appreciation. Fatum and Hutchison (2003, 2006, 2010) rely 















evidence that intervention by the Bank of Japan systemically affects its short-run 
exchange rate. Finally, Kearns and Rigobon (2005) show that interventions by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia and the Bank of Japan have significant effects on the 
Australian dollar and Japanese Yen.   
The effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions ha  also been examined 
using intraday data. Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) highlight the difficulties of 
interpreting the regression results when intervention exchange rates are not available 
and the timing of the intervention usually falls within the interval of the exchange rate 
change. Using a new data set of foreign exchange transactions of the Swiss National 
Bank (SNB) for the period 1986-1994, they were able to study the intraday effects of 
interventions arising from informational differences between interventions and SNB 
customer transactions. Interventions reveal central bank discontent with exchange rate 
conditions and may signal news about future monetary policy while customer 
transactions do not. They were able to show that interventions unlike customer 
transactions affect expectations and exchange rates. In a related study, Payne and 
Vitale (2003) extended the analysis of Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) by matching the 
tick-by-tick transactions data with indicative intraday exchange rate quotes and news 
wire reports of exchange rate interventions. Their event study shows that intervention 
wields the largest impact when the SNB moves with-the-market and when there are 
concerted interventions with the other central banks. Burkhard and Fischer (2009) use 
high-frequency data and demonstrate that the SNB sterili ed intervention references 
depreciated the domestic currency for several hours when short-term interest rates 
reach the zero bound. More recently, Pasquariello (2010) proposes a novel theory of 
the impact of sterilized spot interventions on the microstructure of currency markets 
and their liquidity. The theory specifically explores the manner by which potential 















the impact of central bank interventions on exchange rate dynamics and on the 
liquidity of the forex market.  
In contrast to the literature of foreign exchange intervention in developed 
economies, tests of the effectiveness of interventions in emerging markets are 
limited (Tapia and Tokman, 2004, Guimaraes and Karacad g, 2004, Disyatat and 
Galati, 2007, Bernanke, 2010, Chen, 2011, Domaç and Mendoza, 2004, Hua and 
Gau, 2006, Rincon and Toro, 2011, Menkhoff, 2013). Much of the literature on 
foreign exchange intervention in emerging markets ha featured markets in the 
western hemisphere. Tapia and Tokman (2004) find that interventions by the Central 
Bank of Chile in the foreign exchange market affect both the level and volatility of 
the Chilean Peso during the Asian and Argentinian crises. Guimaraes and Karacadag 
(2004) use a modified generalized autoregressive conditi nal heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model to show that sales of USD interventio increases volatility both in 
the short run and long run and have a significant effect on the Mexican Peso, 
although purchases do not exert any effect. Domaç and Mendoza (2004) show that 
central banks in Mexico and Turkey can effectively influence the directions of their 
currencies. Rincon and Toro (2011) examine the efficacy of intervention when 
combined with capital controls in Colombia during the period 1993 to 2010, 
presenting that their simultaneous use tend to support intervention effectiveness by 
augmenting the exchange rate trend without increasing volatility. 
Intervention studies in Asia are more limited to the case of India. Pattanaik and 
Sahoo (2001) examine the exchange rate policy in India for the period 1995-2003 
under the objectives of stabilizing the exchange rat and keeping market conditions 
orderly. However, the assessment of intervention effectiveness is marred by the fact 















intervention reaction function reveals that India’s central bank reacts to volatility in 
the foreign exchange market but not to misalignments. Goral and Arora (2010), 
using intervention data from the Reserve Bank of India, show that interventions are 
effective in reducing volatilities of the Indian Rupee. As is clear from the limited 
number of studies on Asian foreign exchange intervention, our paper fills a very 
important gap in the literature by using Reuters’ news reports to study the efficacy of 
intervention in eight economies. 
2.3 Newswire reports on foreign exchange interventions 
Reuters news reports have been employed in research on foreign exchange 
interventions for a number of reasons. Reuters news r ports permit researchers to 
employ a narrow reaction window in minutes rather than in hours (Goodhart and 
Hesse, 1993) and days (Fatum and Hutchison, 2003). These news reports when used 
with intra-daily data enable researchers to test the signaling hypothesis (Dominguez, 
2003; Goodhart and Hesse, 1993), and to determine the effectiveness of 
interventions in reducing exchange rate volatility (Chang and Taylor, 1998). But 
how accurate are the Reuters news reports? 
Fischer (2006) studies the qualitative accuracy of the Reuters news reports for 
exchange rate interventions. He alludes to uncertainties in the properties and usage 
of these news reports based on (1) the lack of consensus among empirical 
researchers about the length of time between Reuters intervention announcement 
and the time stamp of actual central bank intervention, (2) the reporting of the 
intervention amount and the markets that the central bank intervenes7, and (3) the 
filtering rule of the news reports and their updates; Chang and Taylor (1998) 
                                                      
7
 Fischer (2006) only examines the Swiss National Bank exchange rate intervention data and find 
that Reuters does not always mention in which market the SNB intervenes and never its intervention 















exclude announcements two hours after the first annou cement while Sapp (2002) 
excludes reports in the first two hours. Using the Swiss National Bank spot 
transactions data, Fischer identifies that there are only six days where Reuters failed 
to report an intervention when the SNB did intervene, but there were no cases of 
false reporting (i.e. Reuters reported an intervention when there was no actual 
intervention). Based on the statistical properties of SNB intervention transactions 
and reported interventions, Fischer (2006) finds that the average number, the 
maximum, the minimum and standard deviation of transactions reported per day are 
substantially lower for Reuters than the actual interventions. Furthermore, there is 
low correlation (ranging from 0.21 to 0.33) between reported and actual 
interventions suggesting that newswire reports for Swiss interventions may not be 
accurate.8   
While the accuracy of Reuters reports for intervention studies is questionable, 
one could either totally disregard the validity of these Reuters news reports as a 
proxy for actual interventions or re-consider their usage but with caution, to the 
extent that Reuters news archives provide some information, though limited as they 
may be, about foreign exchange interventions particularly in an environment where 
no data on foreign exchange interventions are availble such as the case in this study. 
Although information conveyed in these reports may not closely and fully capture 
actual interventions that took place, and if we were to believe Fischer’s (2006) 
results are representative of all newswire reports for other countries central bank 
interventions, we can be assured at the very least th t that these news reports, which 
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 More recently, researchers have considered determinants of false reporting in newswire reports 
caused by jumps in exchange rates and the induced effect of a transparent central bank intervention 
policy on market rumours which depends on oral interventions that are targeted at informing the 
market about the authorties’ viewpoint of the level or volatility of exchange rates (Gnabo et al., 2009).  
Be that as it may, the percentage of false reporting is very low, only about 6% in the case of Bank of 
















provide an underestimate of actual interventions statistics, are conservative estimates 
of actual interventions. This is the position that we take in this study, which leads us 
to use Reuters’ news reports to proxy for intervention activities in the eight Asian 
economies.  
2.4 Recent foreign exchange intervention experience in eight Asian countries 
We provide a brief overview of the foreign exchange int rvention practices in 
eight Asian countries in recent years following the2008 global financial crisis (GFC). 
The discussion below is largely taken from the working papers of the Bank of 
international settlement (2005, 2013) which focus on the motives, techniques and 
implications of foreign exchange intervention in emerging markets, particularly 
changes in the motives and strategy behind the interventions following the 2008 
global financial crisis. Generally, intervention is viewed as an instrument that could 
potentially curb forex volatility and support market functioning. While sterilization 
occurred in several of the interventions, data paucity on central banks’ balance sheet 
does not permit inference that all bank balance sheet expansion can be attributed to 
foreign exchange purchases.  
 
Indonesia 
Following the free floating of the Indonesian exchange rate in August 1997, 
foreign exchange intervention has been used to stabili e rupiah volatility during rapid 
depreciations associated with excess liquidity. TheBIS (2005) reported that for the 
period 1997-2004 foreign exchange market intervention is effective in addressing 
unwarranted exchange rate movements stemming from te porary shocks. 
Maintaining exchange rate stability is deemed an integral part of an overall monetary 
and macroprudential policy mix designed to achieve price stability, economic growth, 















the onset of 2008 global crisis where volatile capital flows, increasing risk appetite 
among global investors, and news on the progress of crisis resolution in the advanced 
economies have increased exchange rate volatility beyond the fundamental.  
The Bank Indonesia intervenes mainly through spot transactions, which 
dominate the domestic foreign exchange market. Apart from direct intervention, Bank 
Indonesia has issued regulations which limit transactions by non-residents and net 
open positions, and by conducting both indirect (off-site) and direct (on-site) 
supervision of market participants. The interventio is conducted through agent banks 
to buy and sell foreign currency (mostly US dollars) depending on excess supply or 
demand conditions in the market, and it is aimed to smooth out the volatility of 
exchange rate movements along the chosen fundamental path. The conduct of foreign 
exchange intervention is integrated with domestic-currency monetary operations so 
that any impact on domestic liquidity is managed anis consistent with supporting the 
interest rate policy (i.e. sterilized intervention). 
Thailand 
Since July 1997 Thailand has adopted a managed-float exchange rate regime. 
The Bank of Thailand intervenes in the foreign exchange market to curb short-term 
excess volatility of the exchange rates and to maintain regional competitiveness, while 
ensuring that the exchange rate is aligned with fundamentals in the medium and long 
run. Shorter-term exchange rate fluctuations are used a  an early warning indicator to 
help signal circumstances where there might be misalignment or destabilising market 
activities. Post 1997 Asian financial crisis, the Bank for a while accumulated foreign 
exchange reserves as a strong stock of reserves, which helps to minimize external 
vulnerability and increase confidence in the economy amongst foreign investors 















Bank’s objectives focused more on discouraging sharp capital inflows from core 
economies during periods of unconventional monetary policy, and on maintaining 
external competitiveness. From 2006 until early 2008, the BOT imposed the 
Unremunerated Reserve Requirement (URR) on short-term capital inflows. Financial 
institutions were required to withhold 30% of foreign currency bought or exchanged 
for the Thai Baht (THB), though transactions related to trades in goods and services. 
Since 2010 the Bank started relaxing regulations in order to encourage capital 
outflows and to restore the balance between capital inflows and outflows in the 
market, creating natural counterflows while helping to promote outward direct 
investment (ODI) and encouraging Thai investment abro d. 
The Bank employs actual intervention but does not anounce any FX operations 
beforehand.9 The Bank intervenes in the foreign exchange market mainly via outright 
spot transactions by buying/selling Thai baht against US dollar, the currency most 
widely traded. The Bank intervene in the interbank FX market both onshore and 
offshore, and using designated agent banks in order to maintain anonymity. Foreign 
exchange swap transactions are sometimes used in conjun tion with outright 
intervention to influence liquidity conditions in the offshore market in order to make 
it more costly to fund speculative positions. In addition, the bank is committed to the 
inflation targeting framework in which the 14-day repurchase rate is used as the 
operating target. Therefore, sterilisation is part of the appropriate management of 
liquidity in the money market. Like many other central banks’ practice in Asia, data 
on foreign exchange market intervention are not published as the Bank is concerned 
that releasing intervention-related data for a small domestic foreign exchange market 
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 If the country’s current and expected fundamentals are in line with suspected intervention, 
















that is not adequately liquid could harm the economy, and the destabilising effect 
could limit the effectiveness of the intervention. 
South Korea 
 After the Asian financial crisis, South Korea changed to a floating exchange rate 
regime in December 1997. Under the new exchange rate regime, the emphasis is to 
attain foreign exchange market stabilization through alleviating excessive short-term 
exchange rate volatility. Both the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and the 
Bank of Korea (BOK) function as the exchange rate administrative body.10 The BOK 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market to mitigate short-term exchange rate 
volatility, to stabilise the foreign exchange market, to pre-empt speculative attacks, 
and to acquire foreign reserves, rather than to maintain a certain exchange rate target. 
It is also the case that the Korean foreign exchange authorities play the role of market 
maker through intervention by supplying sufficient liquidity thus filling the gaps 
between bids and offers in the market. Like Thailand, post Asian financial crisis, 
intervention was, unusually, utilised to increase international reserves in order to 
enhance Korea’s credit rating and to avoid the possibility of another crisis. However, 
the exchange rate and its volatility have shown sharp increases during the global 
financial crisis in 2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis in 2010 and 2011 
contrary to the moderate appreciation in the mid-2000 decade. In periods of crisis, the 
Bank also intervened to alleviate the foreign exchange funding shortages of banks, 
which have experienced severe dollar shortages. The foreign exchange funding 
shortage puts depreciatory pressure on the Korean won and increases exchange rate 
volatility. 
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 However, the BOK, as the central bank, holds and manages the nation's international reserves, 
composed of the foreign exchange stabilisation fund a  the BOK's own reserves, and is also in 
















Both verbal intervention by the authorities and real intervention in the spot 
market are used. Verbal intervention facilitates foreign exchange market stability 
beforehand or forewarns speculative forces of the authorities’ concerns and intention 
related to exchange rate movements. Spot market intrvention is usually preferred 
when the objective is to contain exchange rate volatility, while swap market 
intervention is employed when the aim is to provide dollar liquidity in the market. The 
strength and nature of the external shock, the moveents of market indices, market 
sentiments and the volume of funds available, are all taken into account in making the 
discretionary decision. The BOK monitors exchange rate developments and the 
foreign exchange market situation on a real-time basis through incessant contacts with 
dealers and analysis of various reports from the banks. Korea occasionally sterilises 
changes in its domestic money supply brought about y foreign exchange market 
intervention. Korean authorities have maintained secrecy regarding foreign exchange 
intervention. This is to avoid superfluous controversy over the validity of intervention, 
to induce autonomous exchange rate adjustments throug  market participants’ trading, 
and to prevent speculative forces from benefiting from the relevant information.  
India 
India adopted a market-determined exchange rate sysm in March 1993. Within 
this system, the Reserve Bank of India intervenes occasionally to maintain orderly 
market conditions by curbing excess volatility in exchange rates. India relies on large 
capital inflow to fund its current account deficit. However, the capital flows are 
proven large and lumpy thus making the Indian foreign exchange market particularly 
susceptible to bouts of volatility. Depending on the prevailing market conditions, the 
Bank intervenes in both the spot and forward markets, directly and indirectly. The 















capacity to modulate domestic rupee liquidity conditions in consonance with the 
prevailing monetary policy stance. The indirect approach has the advantage of 
maintaining the confidentiality of the intervention perations, thereby enhancing their 
effectiveness. In 2006–08, the Bank intervened in the market by buying US dollars 
following large and lumpy capital inflows far in excess of the economy’s absorptive 
capacity (BIS, 2013). The rupee, however, came under sharp depreciation pressure in 
the aftermath the of global financial crisis, especially immediately following the 
Lehman collapse in September 2008, and this forced th  Bank to sell US dollars in an 
attempt to restore orderliness in the market. In 2009–11, there was very limited scale 
of intervention operations taken by the Bank as domestic foreign exchange markets 
generally remained stable with the rupee exhibiting range-bound movement (see 
Figure 1 a). Intervention in the foreign exchange market is sometimes sterilized.  
Malaysia 
After pegging the exchange rate to the US dollar following the 1998 Asian 
financial crisis, Malaysia moved to a managed float exchange rate regime in July 
2005. The exchange rate is referenced against a basket of currencies of the country’s 
major trade partners and it is allowed to move according to market forces. The 
central bank intervenes to maintain orderly foreign exchange market conditions with 
a view to avoiding extreme movements in the domestic exchange rate that could 
destabilise the real economy. Over the years, foreign xchange interventions have 
become much less frequent. In recent years, the Bank has focused more on 
addressing periods of market dysfunction. Experience has shown that portfolio flows 
are the main factor influencing ringgit volatility, given that such flows are often 
sizeable, short-term and sensitive to market news. When inflows or outflows have 















maintaining orderly market functioning and reducing any destabilising effects on the 
real economy. In all cases, the decision to intervene has hinged on whether the 
financial markets are judged capable of intermediating these excessive flows. 
Singapore 
  In contrast to other countries, Singapore has used th  exchange rate rather than 
the interest rate as the instrument of monetary policy. The choice of the exchange rate 
is predicated on the Singapore economy’s small size and its high degree of openness 
to trade and capital flows. In particular, the economy’s openness means that the 
exchange rate bears a stable and predictable relationship to price stability as the final 
target of policy over the medium-term. More importantly, the exchange rate is 
relatively controllable through direct intervention in the foreign exchange markets. An 
exchange-rate-based monetary policy thus allows the government to retain greater 
control over macroeconomic outcomes such as output growth and price stability.  
 Singapore operates the basket, band and crawl (BBC) exchange rate system. The 
Singapore dollar is managed against a basket of currencies of its major trading 
partners (also known as the Singapore dollar nominal effective exchange rate or 
S$NEER). The trade-weighted exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate within a policy 
band, which minimises the need for constant foreign exchange interventions, in 
contrast to a system based on a hard currency peg. The slope of the exchange rate 
policy band is reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains consistent with the 
economy’s underlying fundamentals and to avoid misalignment. This is the crawl 
feature which is incorporated in the band. The slope f the policy band, as well as the 
level at which it is centred, is not disclosed.  
Intervention takes place when the S$NEER reaches the edge of the policy band 















The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) will intervene in the foreign exchange 
market using spot or forward transactions through primary dealers (PDs). It may also 
intervene before the band is reached, or allow the S$NEER to breach the band before 
intervening. During the global financial crisis, MAS eased its policy, adopting a zero 
per cent appreciation of S$NEER policy band, amidst expectations of moderating 
inflationary pressures and the risk of further deterioration in the external environment. 
The policy band was subsequently re-centred downwards in 2009. Singapore, like 
other emerging Asian economies, has to tackle the consequences of sustained capital 
inflows following the adoption of unusual monetary policies in developed economies. 
MAS has not had to undertake any capital flow management measures in its conduct 
of monetary policy.  
 
 Philippines 
The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has adopted a floating exchange rate 
regime in which exchange rates are determined by the interplay of supply and demand 
factors in the foreign exchange market. Intervention by the BSP is driven by 
objectives to maintain monetary stability, to curb excessive exchange market 
speculation, and to discourage sharp capital inflows and outflows (BIS, 2013). The 
recent surge in foreign exchange inflows into the Philippines has allowed BSP to 
build up its international reserves, which help to insulate the economy against external 
shocks. Notwithstanding that, structural flows continue to be the dominant source of 
foreign exchange with the largest share coming from the export sector followed by 
remittances from overseas Filipinos and receipts from business process outsourcing 
services.  
Foreign exchange trading is conducted through the Pilippine Dealing System 















Association of the Philippines (BAP) and the BSP. Electronic trading is conducted 
through the Philippine Dealing and Exchange Corporation (PDEx), which was 
designated by the BAP as the official service provider for USD/PHP spot trading. 
BSP never pre-announces its foreign exchange interventions. Its decisions to intervene 
may be based on current developments or may call for pre-emptive action before the 
markets react to developing situations. It intervenes in both the spot and forward FX 
markets, and it also occasionally uses derivatives. BIS (2013) reports that for the 
2005-2012 period interventions have been successful at limiting exchange rate 
volatility. Besides accumulating international reserves BSP sterilises the associated 
potential inflationary impact of intervention in recent years. There has been a decline 
in the extent of sterilisation between the 1994-2001 period and the 2002-2010 period, 
which may indicate that the policy shift from monetary aggregate targeting to 
inflation targeting has given the BSP greater flexibility to achieve price stability 
without relying so much on sterilising excessive foreign exchange inflows. 
Taiwan 
Taiwan adopts a managed floating exchange rate regime and market forces have 
been permitted to affect the movements of the new Taiwan dollar since 1987. The 
Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan), know  as CBC, regularly intervenes 
in the foreign exchange market to smooth out the day-to-day excess fluctuations. 
Taiwan’s currency is one of the steadiest across emerging markets even when it has a 
material current account surplus. There were reports that the CBC engaged in 
end-of-day intervention by setting the closing exchange rate at the last half-hour of 
currency trading in Taiwan11. CBC denied this end-of-day intervention and claimed 
that they intervene only when the market is disrupted by seasonal or irregular factors.  
                                                      















In addition, CBC also uses moral suasion to affect the level of new Taiwan dollar and 
reduce the cost and visibility of exchange-rate management.   
3. Data  
This paper focuses on eight economies in Asia: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. Our sample period 
covers January 2005 to November 2013. Daily exchange rate data are obtained from 
Bloomberg. The data are the composite rates by all banks offering traded prices to 
Bloomberg. We retrieved Taiwan’s exchange rates (TWD) data using the opening 
and closing rates from Taipei Forex. The opening and closing exchange rates are 
defined for Hong Kong trading hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:59 p.m., respectively. The 
same trading hours are employed for Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Korea, and Thailand. In addition, we obtain India’s quotes for Mumbai’s 
trading hours from 9:00 a.m. to 4:59 p.m. We see that Asian countries exchange rates 
follow a similar pattern in that they generally appreciated relative to the US dollar, at 
times rapidly, until March 2008, depreciated very sharply until March 2009, and 
then appreciated gradually after the implementation of quantitative easing by the 
U.S. Federal Reserve until about 2013. In the case of India and Indonesia, the two 
countries’ currencies experienced steep depreciation s arting mid- 2011.  
We use Reuters’ news reports to extract information about central bank 
interventions in the foreign exchange market. These news reports consist of the date 
and time of a reported intervention. Our classifications of news reports are similar to 
that of Fatum and Hutchison (2002). Intervention news reports are classified as firm, 
suspected, supported, and neutral. A report is classified as a firm report when the 
news clearly state that the central bank intervened i  the currency markets. This is 















as a suspected report when the news cast doubt on official intervention in the foreign 
exchange market. This is synonymous with category A of Fatum and Hutchison 
(2002). A report is classified as a supported report when central bank or government 
officials provide statements that show support for intervention in the currency 
market (including suggestions that intervention is a possibility). This is equivalent to 
category B of Fatum and Hutchison (2002). A report is classified as a neutral report 
when central bank or government officials express neutral opinion on intervention 
activities. Firm reports are more certain on central banks’ intervention activities and 
suspected reports are possible interventions with doubt. These two categories of 
reports specifically distinguish intervention in the buying and selling of US dollars.  
The supported and neutral categories are news reports of central bank or 
government officials’ verbal interventions on the foreign exchange market, and they 
do not highlight the difference in the intervention. Table A1 in the Appendix 
provides examples of the news reports and their categories. 
- Table 1 about here - 
Table 1 presents the distribution of intervention reports of the eight Asian 
countries categorized into firm, suspected, supported, and neutral reports. Panel (a) 
shows the number of intervention reports in two sub- ample periods. The first 
sample period (2005-2007) has a significantly fewer number of reports for firm and 
suspected reports than that in the second sample period (2008-2013). The second 
sample period coincides with the subprime crisis, which led to the introduction of 
the quantitative easing policy adopted by the US Federal Reserve. The fall in U.S. 
interest rates has brought about huge swings in capital flows to emerging market 















exchange market intervention strategies. Quite unlike their experiences in the 
mid-2000s, some Asian countries found themselves having to intervene against strong 
appreciation pressures. It is not surprising, therefore, that the majority of intervention 
reports happened in this period. Panel (b) shows the number of days for which news 
on intervention is reported in the Asian countries. There are more intervention 
reports for Taiwan, South Korea, and Indonesia. We see that central banks in these 
countries intervened heavily in the foreign exchange market during the second 
sample period and the number of days with intervention reports mainly concentrate 
in the firm report category. We performed a test of the difference-in-mean of the 
intervention frequency for the sample periods 2005-2 07 and 2008-2010 and we 
found that the null of equality in the mean is rejected in all eight countries at all 
conventional significance levels. The results clearly suggest that the average 
intervention frequency has intensified post-2008.12   
- Figure 1 about here - 
Figures 1(a) to (h) plot the value of the US dollar against the Asian currencies 
of all eight countries. The plot is superimposed against the intervention dummy, 
which indicates purchases (+1) and sales (-1) of the US dollar. The figures show that 
the central banks of India, Indonesia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Thailand intervened constantly to keep their exchange rates from falling against the 
US dollar from 2007 to 2008 and after 2009. The various countries also responded 
differently to the rise in the value of the US dollar from 2008 to 2009. Some 
countries allowed their local currency to appreciate more against the US dollar, 
while others intervened massively to hold their exchange rate to fluctuate within a 
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 For brevity, we do not report the difference-in-mean test results but they are available from the 















limited range. This is consistent with the notions that some countries monitor the 
region’s exchange rates and attempt to keep the relativ  value of their currencies in 
line with the value of selected regional currencies.  
It is clear from these figures that most central banks in Asian countries tend to 
purchase (sell) US dollars when the US dollar depreciat s (appreciates), which 
indicates that these countries are attempting to counter large changes in the value of 
their domestic currencies in the sample period. Another noteworthy observation is 
that in several of these Asian countries there are many episodes of intervention 
occurring on the same day, implying persistence by the authorities in coordinating 
with market participants to influence the level of the exchange rate. 
 
On May 22, 2013, U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben rnanke stated in 
testimony before Congress that that Fed may taper th  size of the bond-buying 
program (or quantitative easing, QE). While Bernanke's surprising pronouncement led 
to substantial turmoil in the financial markets during the second half of 2013, the Fed 
did not officially announce its first reduction in QE until December 18, 2013. The 
reason for this move was that the economy had becom strong enough for the Fed to 
feel confident in reducing the level of stimulus. We note that the number of firm reports 
increased for all countries except Singapore in the period from May 22 to November 30, 
2013 compared to the period prior to the tapering anouncement, holding the duration 
constant. Specifically, the number of intervention after Bernanke’s tapering 
announcement in May 22, 2013 increases with more sales (purchase) of US dollar in 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand (Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan).13 
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 The graphs, which are not reported here for brevity, are plotted for the period 2012/11/21 to 
2013/11/29 with the tapering announcement date on 2013/5/22 dividing the sample into equal period. 
It was found that India and Singapore responded very differently after the tapering announcement; 















4. Methodology and Empirical Results 
4.1 Methodology 
4.1.1 Defining intervention success  
     Following Humpage (1999), we specify three success criteria, which include a 
broad criterion and two component criteria. We treat ch criterion as an official 
prediction of exchange rate movements and test whether intervention has forecast 
value using a nonparametric test proposed by Merton (1981) and Henriksson and 
Merton (1981).  
 Criterion 1 in the following equation represents the broad measure of success: 
 =	 1	 		 > 0		∆ > 0, 	∆ > ∆ , 		 < 0		∆ < 0, 	∆ < ∆	;							0			ℎ.																																																																	          (1) 
 equals one which implies success if intervention purchases (sales) of US dollars 
are associated either with dollar appreciations (depreciations) at time t, or with 
smaller dollar depreciations (appreciations) when comparing ∆ with ∆. tI  
designates official intervention at time t with positive (negative) values being 
purchases (sales) of US dollar intervention; ∆ =  − , where SAM and 
SPM are, respectively, morning and afternoon exchange rates expressed as foreign 
currency units per dollar, and ∆ =  − !". The morning-to-closing 
analysis is used to capture short-lived market respon e to intervention. 
     To examine the nature of the response, we break the general success criterion 
(Equation (1)) into its two component parts. The first component of the general 
criterion (criterion 2) counts a success if 1 equals one, i.e. intervention by Asian 
countries is successful if a dollar appreciation (depreciation) accompanies an 
                                                                                                                                                        
India did the reverse. Indonesia continued to buy US dollar and the intervention intensified 
post-announcement. South Korea and Taiwan appeared to intervene intensively around about the 















intervention purchase (sale) of US dollars.  
1 =	1	 		 > 0		∆ > 0, 				 < 0		∆ < 0;									0			ℎ.																														                   (2) 
     The second component of the general criterion (criterion 3), which is 
consistent with “leaning-against-the-wind” strategy, counts a success if 2 equals 
one, i.e. an intervention purchase (sale) of US dollars accompanies a smaller dollar 
depreciation (appreciation).  
2 =	 1	 		 > 0		∆ > ∆ , $%	∆		∆ < 0, 			 < 0		∆ < ∆ , $%	∆		∆ > 0;								0			ℎ.																																																																																															 (3) 
To ensure that our results are not biased by any day-of-the-week effects on 
exchange rates, we fit at ARMA(1,1) model with Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and 
Thursday dummies on ∆. We fail to find any evidence of such effects, which s 
consistent with the findings of Yamori and Kurihara (2004) who observe that 
day-of-the-week effects in exchange rates are no loger prevalent in the 1990s.  
4.1.2 Testing the forecast value of intervention 
     Merton (1981), Henriksson and Merton (1981) develop a nonparametric test 
to evaluate investment managers’ forecasting skills. Humpage (1999) apply it to 
central bank intervention by treating each success riterion as an official forecast of 
near-term dollar movements. Following Humpage (1999), we use this method to 
assess the forecasting ability of central bank interventions in Asian countries. 
Evidence of positive forecasting skills would imply that monetary authorities of 
Asian countries possess superior information.  
 For example, consider Asian central banks purchase of US dollars and the 
general success criterion 1, and define:  















1 − &1 = &'	(	 ≥ 0|∆ < 0, 	∆ < ∆*             (5) 
&2							 = &'	(	 ≥ 0|∆ > 0, 	∆ > ∆*             (6) 
1 − &2 = &'	(	 < 0|∆ > 0, 	∆ > ∆*             (7) 
In equation (4), p1 is the probability that intervention sale of US dollar by an 
Asian central bank on day t conditional on the exchange rate conforming to the 
success criterion given by equation (1). In equation (6), p2 is the probability that the 
central bank does not sale dollar on day t conditional on the foreign exchange rate 
not conforming to the success criterion of equation (1). Equations (5) and (7) are the 
complementary equations for equations (4) and (6).  
The null hypothesis that intervention provides no value is equivalent to p1=1- 
p2 or p1+p2=1. Market participants would not revise their prior estimates of the 
distribution of exchange rate changes as a result of intervention. Intervention has 
positive (negative) forecast value if pl+p2>1 (pl+p2<1). In the case when p1+p2>1, 
market participants can profit from trading in the direction with which Asian central 
banks intervene in the foreign exchange market. On the other hand, if p1+p2<1, 
market participants could profitably bet against Asian central banks. 
The number of effective US dollar purchases (sales) by Asian central banks 
under the null hypothesis has a hypergeometric distribution (Henriksson and Merton, 
1981, Humpage, 1999), which is independent of the conditional probability or the 
underlying distribution of the change in exchange rat s. In Table 2, if one minus the 
cumulative density function (CDF) for the hypergeometric distribution is less than 
0.01, we reject the null in favor of a positive forecast value. If 1-CDF is greater than 
0.99, we reject the null in favor of a negative forecast value. 















  Using the logistic density function, we estimate th conditional probabilities 
of successful interventions by Asian central banks. The following logit function 
measures the odds of success as  
,-. =	 ln 1 2-3"!2-34 = 	5.'- + 7.                       (8) 
, where	8. is the probability of a successful intervention, which is estimated by the 
relative frequency of successes in n trials. 5. is a (1×K) vector of explanatory 
variables, which may affect the probability of successful intervention by Asian 
central banks. '- is a (K×1) vector of estimated parameters.  
The first explanatory variable used in this paper is the aggregate number of 
news on day t (NEWS). Ideally one would measure the success of intervention using 
the intervention amount, which accords with the portfolio-adjustment theory of 
exchange rate determination (Humpage, 1999). Due to the lack of intervention 
amounts data for Asian countries, we construct a proxy for intervention amounts 
using the number of aggregate intervention news on a specific day. However, given 
intervention news reports, NEWS, and exchange rate movements are endogenous, 
the estimated coefficients would be biased. We show in section 4.1.4 how the 
problem of endogeneity can be circumvented by using Heckman’s (1979) two-step 
procedure.  
 The second explanatory variable is the number of different sample countries 
intervening on the same day (COUN). Past studies have shown that coordinated 
interventions have a bigger impact on exchange rates than do unilateral interventions 
(Dominguez and Frankel, 1990, 1993). Humpage (1999) finds that coordinated 
interventions with Germany and Japan increase the odds f successful intervention 
against the USD. In our sample, the highest number of coordinated interventions is 















 The third explanatory variable we used is a dummy variable that equals one 
when intervention day t is the first intervention day in the past five busine s days 
(FIRS). This is in accordance with Humpage’s (1999) observation that intervention 
tends to take place over a number of consecutive days, followed by a number of 
days of inaction. More often than not, the first intervention of a chain of 
interventions has a more dominant effect on exchange rates than subsequent ones, 
implying that the first intervention signals more information to the market than latter 
interventions.  
 In addition, we include a fourth variable explanatory variable, SUPP, which is a 
dummy variable that equals one when official statements supporting interventions 
appeared on day t. We argue that such statements are likely to carry weight in 
influencing market expectations and will, therefore, increase the likelihood of 
intervention success.  
 Finally, the last explanatory variable is a dummy variable equals one when 
official intervention reports are neutral (NEUT). This variable is used to test whether 
neutral reports provide any information regarding the odds of intervention success.  
Because some countries may not have enough official statements about supporting 
interventions or neutral news reports to warrant the estimation coefficients, these 
variables are not included when estimating the logit regressions. 
 To account for the impact of coincidental reports f other events on the chances 
for intervention success, we include dummy variables for the announcements of 
changes of repurchase rate (RR), interest rate (IR), interbank overnight rate (IOR), 
gross domestic product (GDP), consumer price index (CPI), balance of trade (BOT), 
and current account balance (CAB) of each country i our sample. Only results for 
reported macroeconomic announcements are presented for brevity and results with 















4.1.4 Intervention reaction function     
 Because intervention and exchange rate movements are endogenous estimated 
coefficients for the variables in equation (8) could be biased. To circumvent the 
problem of endogeneity, we estimate an intervention reaction function. The logit 
model in (8) includes the absolute value of the reaction function’s predicted 
interventions that correspond to observed interventions. Intervention reaction 
functions typically include an exchange rate target, and a measure of volatility, 
which reflects market disorder (Edison, 1993). We follow this pattern in modeling 
the decision to intervene, but include a separate equation for the intensity of 
intervention proxied by the numbers of intervention news reports.  
Because Asian central banks may intervene out of concern for both the level 
and the volatility of their exchange rates, we estima e the intervention reaction 
function using both ten-day moving average (MOVAG) and a ten-day rolling 
standard deviation (SIG) of each country.14 It was indicated in the literature review 
that shorter-term exchange rate fluctuations could be used as an early warning 
indicator to help signal circumstances where there might be misalignment or 
destabilising market activities. Equation (9) describes the intervention reaction 
functions for Asian central banks: 
9∗ = V<a + 7                            (9) 
where V<a = a>? +MOVAG< × a>" + SIG< × a>G. 
To construct a reaction function with unbiased parameter estimates, we estimate 
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 The use of 10-day moving average is consistent with that of Humpage (1990). While the 
co-ordination channel views intervention as motivated by exchange rate misalignment from its 
long-run value, the intervention practices of many Asian countries in the period after the global 
financial crisis are associated with short-term exchange rate movements and excess volatility. For 
















a probit model for the decision to intervene and calcul te the inverse Mills ratio. We 
then estimate a separate equation for the number of intervention reports, using the 
inverse Mills ratio to control for sample selection bias (Heckman, 1979). 
H is the number of intervention reports in Asian countries. We estimate the 
number of news report in equation (10):  
H = $	+	ε<                           (10) 
where	$ = $>? + ∆ × $>" . Here, H is observable only when9∗ > 0 .  
Assuming both J and K follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean zero 
and variances gives by LMG and	LNG, and their correlation, O, we can obtain the 
conditional expectation of H	as 
EQH	|H		'%R = EQH|9∗ > 0R 
=	$ + EQK|H > −SaR 
=	$ + ρσVσW(X QSaR ΦQSaR⁄ *              (11) 
where XQSaR  is the normal density function, and ΦQSaR  is the cumulative 
normal density function. The term in the square bracket on the right-hand side of the 
final expression in equation (11) is the Mills ratio, which corrects for sample 
selection bias.  
4.2 Empirical Results 
4.2.1 Did Asian central banks successfully intervene in the foreign exchange 
market? 
Table 2 presents the results of successful intervention and its predicted value 
for the firm intervention news category. The result show that most Asian central 















and intervened more often by purchasing US dollars to halt the rise of their own 
currencies when the US dollar depreciated. 
The effectiveness of central bank intervention varies among Asian countries in 
Panels A to H of Table 2. By definition, p1 is the probability that a central bank in an 
Asian country sell US dollar on day t conditional on the exchange rate conforming 
to the success criteria. We find that the number is small compared to p2, which is the 
probability that the central bank does not sell US dollar on day t conditional on the 
foreign exchange rate not conforming to the success criteria. Even when 
interventions were completely ineffective and randomly undertaken, the martingale 
nature of exchange rate changes would insure that it often appeared successful. The 
“virtual successes”, which counts the number of times the exchange rate mimicked a 
success criterion without central bank intervention, indicates that exchange rates 
conformed to the general success criterion on sixty percent of the sample days. For 
six of the sixteen general success categories in Table 2, the frequency of actual 
successes exceeds that of virtual successes. 
Using the broad success criterion 1, we can reject the null hypothesis at the 
95% confidence level in favor of a positive forecast value (p1 + p2 > 1) for the 
purchases and sales of US dollar intervention in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. 
This suggests that interventions have positive values as recent exchange rate 
changes will reverse after interventions by these thr e countries. The economic 
significance of this result is that central banks in these countries possess superior 
information which intervention conveys to foreign exchange market. In terms of 
criterion 2, we show that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 95% confidence 
level in favor of a positive forecast value for purchases of US dollar intervention in 















Philippines, and Taiwan. This overwhelming result is indicative that market 
participants can profit from trading in the direction with which Asian central banks 
intervene in the foreign exchange market.    
Results based on criterion 3 indicate that interventions are more effective in 
reducing local currency changes against the US dollar. We can reject the null 
hypothesis at the 95% confidence level in favor of a negative forecast value (pl + p2 < 
1) in seven of the eight countries for purchases of US dollar intervention and all the 
eight countries for sales of US dollar intervention. These results imply that purchases 
(sales) of US dollar intervention lead to a smaller local currency appreciation 
(depreciation) against the US dollar, which is consistent with the notion that Asian 
countries have adopted a leaning-against-the-wind intervention policy. The negative 
values indicate that recent exchange rates changes will moderate, but will not reverse.  
- Table 2 about here - 
For criterion 3, the percentage of actual successes always exceeds the virtual 
success. This suggests that, for the most part, the frequency of success under 
criterion 3 is greater than that of a random event. We can reject the null hypothesis 
of no forecast value for purchases and sales of US dollars intervention by Asian 
central banks with a high level of confidence under criterion 3. Together, the 
evidence suggests that firm intervention reports have substantive predictive power 
on the near-term exchange rate movements, and that market participants can benefit 
from the information conveyed to market through central bank intervention. Results 
in this section are based on firm intervention repots.15 The next two sections of the 
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 Between 2009 and 2013, South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, amongst other countries 
introduced controls to discourage inflows of hot money that they feared would drive their currencies 
to uncompetitive levels. The type of capital controls are “soft” controls which involve market based 
taxes on certain types of flows, changes to withholding taxes and differential reserves, and liquidity 















paper demonstrate that various aspects of how Asian central bank undertake their 
interventions and factors which can increase the probability of their successes. 
4.2.2 What factors drive central bankers to intervene? 
Table 3 presents the estimates of the reaction functions for our sample countries. 
It can be seen from the negative and statistically significant coefficient of MOVAG 
that central banks in six of the eight countries with the exception of Indonesia and 
Taiwan that they tend to intervene in the markets when their own currencies 
appreciate against the US dollar. In addition, exchange rates in six of the eight 
countries with exception of Thailand and Malaysia are more volatile as shown in the 
ten-day rolling standard deviation, which also increases the probability of 
interventions. This result is consistent with the vi w put forward by BIS (2013) 
about the intervention experience of many of the Asian central bankers who 
intervene to calm disorderly market during period of high capital inflows. It is 
interesting to note that only the coefficient of ∆SAM< for Singapore and Taiwan is 
statistically significant at the conventional significance level, which suggests that 
there are more intervention reports for these countries when their currencies have 
higher exchange rate changes (∆SAM<).16  
-  Table 3 about here - 
                                                                                                                                                        
developed by Fernandez et al. (2015). The index has a range of 0 to 1 with 1 denoting high capital 
control and 0 denoting no capital control. To conserve space, we do not report the index of the 8 
countries over time. We found that Singapore and South Korea exhibit the lowest ka index. Based on 
the index average, we classified the countries into two groups; an average above (below) 0.5 is high 
(low) capital control countries. The high capital control countries are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, and Thailand, while the low capital contr l countries are South Korea and Singapore. 
The empirical analysis on the success of intervention is performed on these two groups of countries 
excluding Taiwan as there is no ka index for Taiwan. We found that intervention based on the general 
criterion is effective for sales of US dollar in countries with high capital control. However, for crite ia 
2 and 3, purchases of US dollar are found to be effective in moderating the change in exchange rate 
movements for both high and low capital control countries. These results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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 We perform the analysis using a 30-day moving average nd the results remain qualitatively 
















4.2.3 What determine the odds of successful intervention? 
Having estimated the intervention reaction function, we obtain NEWSHAT to 
proxy for the number of intervention reports, which adjusts for sample selection bias. 
Table 4 presents the odds of successful interventions, according to the broad 
criterion 1. It can be seen that the odds of successful interventions according to this 
criterion increase significantly with the number of firm intervention reports in all six 
countries except Thailand. However, the coefficient s imates of NEWSHAT for 
Indonesia, Philippines and South Korea are virtually zero to make any economic 
significance. Based on the estimated coefficient, the increase in the odds of 
successful intervention from having no firm intervention report to having one firm 
intervention report is about 50% for India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan, all 
things remaining unchanged. In other words, the probability of a successful 
intervention for India, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan is virtually close to 1 when 
there is a firm intervention report. The probability of having no firm intervention 
report is 0.5, ceteris paribus. Consequently, having a firm intervention report 
significantly improves the likelihood of intervention success in India, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Taiwan.  
The odds of successful interventions increase significa tly with the number of 
coordinated interventions (i.e. COUN) and with the first intervention day in the past 
five business days (i.e. FIRS) for all the countries. When no country is jointly 
intervening on the same day, the probability of successful intervention is 0.5. When 
another country jointly intervenes on the same day, the probability of successful 
intervention goes up by 32% for South Korea (the highest increase in the odds) and 
23% for Taiwan and Indonesia (the lowest increase in the odds). When two countries 















one country jointly intervene is about 28% for all countries. In other words, on 
average, when there is a joint intervention between two countries, the odds of 
successful intervention are about 78%. This increment in the odds of successful 
intervention is economically significant. This result is consistent with Humpage 
(1999) who finds that coordinated intervention has a propensity to increase the odds 
of successful intervention.  
The dummy for the first intervention day in the past five business days displays 
significant explanatory power and has a dominant influe ce on the probability of 
successful intervention. On average, the probability increases by as much as about 
48% in all countries. This is economically significant as the odds of successful first 
day intervention in the past five business days are about 98%. This result suggests 
that most of the information, which is critical for shaping market perception about 
exchange rates in Asian countries is prevalent in the first of five business days of 
interventions. Our result contrasts that of Humpage (1999) who does not find that 
first day intervention exerts a significant influenc  on increasing the odds of 
successful intervention.  
When an official statement supporting interventions ( eutral reports) has 
appeared in Reuters’ news reports, six (five) of the eight countries show statistically 
significant results. Although the results suggest tha both types of news increase the 
odds of successful intervention, the increase in the odds of success is higher for a 
supporting intervention statement than for a neutral st tement. The presence of an 
official supporting statement increases the odds of uccessful intervention by 42% 
on average. This is economically significant and it is effective in increasing the odds 
of successful intervention as official supporting statement is less likely to be 















- Table 4 about here - 
Table 5 provides the results for the joint significan e of the explanatory 
variables. The results are presented according to a number of benchmark covariates. 
Taking the case of India as an example, the first benchmark covariate is NEWSHAT, 
as this variable is not only statistically significant, but it also has the highest 
magnitude for its coefficient than the other variables in Table 4. In each benchmark 
regression, additional variables are added one at a time to the benchmark covariate(s) 
and model adequacy is evaluated using the likelihood ratio test. LR test1 reports the 
test statistic for the null that the coefficients of the covariates other than the intercept 
are all equal to zero. LR test2 reports the test statistic for the null that coefficients of 
the additional covariates other than the benchmark covariates are equal to zero. The 
purpose of LR test2 is to determine the joint signif cance of the additional variables 
other than the benchmark covariate(s). For this reaon, LR test2 provides the basis 
of the subsequent benchmark covariates.  
Following on from the example of India, the second set of benchmark 
covariates is determined by the results of the first set of benchmark regressions with 
NEWSHAT as the sole benchmark covariate. Here, COUN displays the highest 
likelihood ratio test value from LR test2 (i.e. 90.27) in Table 5 compared to the other 
variables, and hence the second benchmark covariates are NEWSHAT and FIRS. 
The third benchmark covariates are determined using the LR test2 results of the 
second set of benchmark regressions. COUN clearly has t e highest test statistic 
value (of 60.97) for LR test2, and NEWSHAT, FIRS and COUN form the third set 
of benchmark covariates. Following this process of inference, the last benchmark 
covariates for India are NEWSHAT, FIRS and SUPP. We apply the same process of 















Referring to the benchmark covariates (2) to (4) for India, whenever the 
variable NEUT is added to the regressors, the test statistic of LR test2 fails to 
become statistically significant at the 5% level, implying that neutral reports of 
intervention by Reuters do not have any explanatory p wer on the odds ratio. It can 
be seen based on the different permutation and combination of covariates across all 
eight countries, three covariates, namely NEWSHAT, FIRS and COUN are key to 
improving the odds of successful intervention in all eight countries.  In sum, the 
success of intervention relies heavily on the presence of a firm report, a coordinated 
intervention and the first day of five days of interv ntions.  
- Table 5 about here – 
A natural question that arises is whether the results are robust to different 
categories of intervention news reports. That is, do other news categories (suspected, 
supports and neutral) have different effects than firm intervention reports? To 
address this issue, we use firm and suspected news reports and repeat the analysis 
for the forecast value of intervention. To conserve space, we do not report the 
empirical results, but we find that the results are qualitatively unchanged based on 
these intervention reports. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
5. Conclusion 
Given the volatile capital flows experienced by Asian economies in the years 
following the global financial crisis, foreign exchange market developments and the 
corresponding interventions by Asian central banks have quickly become pertinent 
issues. The strong capital flows into Asian economies which have impacted domestic 
exchange rates has raised macroeconomic and financial stability concerns, as well as 
the question about what central banks in Asian economies can do about it. Many of 















rebuild foreign reserves stocks following the Asian financial crisis in which many of 
their reserves have been depleted while defending their currencies. This paper 
therefore seeks to address the impact of interventions by Asian central banks on their 
exchange rates during the period of reserves accumulation and the global financial 
crisis.  
Using an approach that relies on the use of Reuters’ news reports as a 
conservative proxy for Asian central bank interventio s, we demonstrate the near-term 
relationship between Asian central bank intervention and their exchange rates. The 
results show that leaning-against-the-wind intervention strategies are effective in all 
eight Asian countries during January 2005 to Novembr 2013. This implies that 
interventions by Asian central banks provide a value only as a forecast that recent 
dollar movements would dampen. In particular, for purchases of US dollar 
intervention, we find that central banks in these countries possess superior 
information which intervention conveys to foreign exchange market. An important 
implication of this result is that market participants may be able to utilize this 
information to make profit from trading in the direction with which Asian central 
banks intervene in the foreign exchange market. In addition, we find that coordinated 
interventions significantly improve the odds of effective intervention. The first day of 
a string of interventions is also associated with hgher odds of effective interventions. 
We also find, by and large, that central banks intervene to smooth the near-term trend 
of exchange rates and to calm its volatility, thus s pporting the view that central banks 
intervene to calm disorderly market during the credit crisis period. 
We have shown that interventions by Asian central banks in the near-term 
appear successful in altering or moderating exchange rate movements. In the 















Asian currencies against the USD during the period of quantitative easing, which 
could have potentially hurt their export sectors. Moreover, we have identified that in 
dealing with capital flows’ volatility, a collective plan is the key to increasing the 
likelihood of success. In contrast to the usual standalone actions based on each 
country’s individual needs, we find that unilateral actions may not be sufficient to 
achieve the desired outcome of influencing the level and direction of exchange rate 
movements. Given that the first day of a string of days of interventions has a 
significant impact on influencing market expectations about the exchange rate level 
and increases the odds of successful intervention, i  may be in the interest of central 
banks to intervene with greater intensity (in terms of intervention volume) on that 
first day.  
Although foreign exchange intervention by central bnks may impede the 
direction and levels of exchange rate movements during the crisis period, it provides 
only a short-term solution to the problem of volatile capital flows (Humpage, 2013). 
Recent policy initiatives emphasize the role of macroprudential policy which is 
designed to address systemic risk. Such risks can emanate from significant 
macroeconomic shocks like volatile capital flows, which can cause distress in the 
financial system, cause unwinding of imbalances in the financial system generated 
by excessive leverage, and contagion risk arising from increasing interconnectedness 
and herd behaviour. Macroprudential policy takes into consideration the system 
wide economy, employs early identification of risks and its sources as a first step in 
the policy-setting process, and adopts the use of various policy instruments that 
complement monetary policy, which counter the financi l cycle. Exchange rate 
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Table 1 Central Bank Intervention News Distribution 
 
Panel (a) Number of news counts 
Country 
Firm Suspected Supported Neutral 
2005- 2008- Total 2005- 2008- Total 2005- 2008- Total 2005- 2008- Total 
2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 
India 48 113 161 66 104 170 4 7 11 1 2 3 
Indonesia 3 253 256 0 32 32 3 40 43 0 15 15 
Malaysia 2 47 49 2 12 14 1 3 4 1 0 1 
Philippines 10 139 149 3 39 42 0 13 13 0 10 10 
Singapore 1 50 51 4 40 44 1 1 2 0 3 3 
South 
Korea 
8 271 279 3 108 111 13 75 88 0 20 20 
Taiwan 11 321 332 2 31 33 0 21 21 0 15 15 
Thailand 4 161 165 6 35 41 0 42 42 0 14 14 
 
Panel (b) Number of days with news reports 
Country Firm Suspected Supported Neutral 
India 93 102 10 3 
Indonesia 204 25 36 12 
Malaysia 38 12 3 1 
Philippines 120 38 12 8 
Singapore 43 35 2 3 
South Korea 182 93 65 16 
Taiwan 261 24 19 9 
Thailand 116 37 34 14 
 
Note: A report is classified as a firm  report when the news clearly state that the central bank 
intervened in currency markets. A report is classified as a suspected report when the news cast 
doubt on official intervention in the foreign exchange market. A report is classified as a 
supported report when central bank or government officials provide statements that show 
support for intervention in the currency market (including suggestions that intervention is a 
possibility). A report is classified as a neutral report when central bank or government 















Figure 1 Plots of Asian Currencies viz-a-viz US Dollar and Intervention Dummy 
 
 
Figure 1(a):  India 
 
Intervene is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the central bank of India buys US dollars from 
the exchange market on certain dates, equal to -1 when the bank sells US dollars, or equal to 0 
otherwise. SPM is the daily closing price of USD against the Indian Rupee. 
 
 
Figure 1(b):  Indonesia 
 
Intervene is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the central bank of Indonesia buys US dollars 
from the exchange market on certain dates, equal to -1 when the bank sells US dollars, or equal to 














































Figure 1(c):  Malaysia 
 
Intervene is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the central bank of Malaysia buys US dollars 
from the exchange market on certain dates, equal to -1 when the bank sells US dollars, or equal to 
0 otherwise. SPM is the daily closing price of USD against the Malaysian Ringgit. 
 
 
Figure 1(d):  Philippines 
 
Intervene is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the central bank of Philippines buys US 
dollars from the exchange market on certain dates, equal to -1 when the bank sells US dollars, 













































Figure 1(e):  Singapore 
 
Intervene is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the central bank of Singapore buys US 
dollars from the exchange market on certain dates, equal to -1 when the bank sells US 





Figure 1(f):  South Korea 
 
Intervene is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the central bank of South Korea buys 
US dollars from the exchange market on certain dates, equal to -1 when the bank sells US 












































Figure 1(g):  Taiwan 
 
Intervene is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the central bank of Taiwan buys US 
dollars from the exchange market on certain dates, equal to -1 when the bank sells US 




Figure 1(h):  Thailand 
 
 Intervene is a dummy variable equal to 1 when the central bank of Thailand buys US 
dollars from the exchange market on certain dates, equal to -1 when the bank sells US 














































Table 2 Asian Central Bank Intervention and Alternative Success Criteria (Firm News 
Category) 
Figures in columns 2, 3, and 4 are the total number of actual intervention, the number of days of 
successful exchange rate intervention based on a succe s criterion, and the percentage of successful 
intervention, respectively. Figures in columns 5, 6, and 7 are total business days, the number of days 
of successful exchange rate interventions based on a success criterion, and the percentage of virtual 
successful intervention, respectively. p1 is the probability that a central bank purchases (or sells) US 
dollars on day t conditional on the exchange rate conforming to the crit rion. p2 is the probability that 
a central bank does not purchase (or sell) US dollars on day t conditional on the foreign exchange rate 
not conforming to the criterion. p1+p2 denotes the prediction value for intervention. The final column 
is the value of the test statistic given by one minus the cumulative density function (CDF). ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: India 
 
Intervention Virtual 
p1 p2 p1+p2 1-CDF Total Successes Total Successes 
# # % # # % 
General 
           
     Purchases 49 29 59.2 2,190 1,421 64.9 0.020 0.974 0.994 0.758 
 
       Sales 44 33 75.0 2,190 1,304 59.5 0.025 0.988 1.013 0.010 *** 
            
Appreciate / Depreciate 
           
     Purchases 49 20 40.8 2,190 1,157 52.8 0.017 0.972 0.989 0.941 * 
       Sales 44 17 38.6 2,190 1,010 46.1 0.017 0.977 0.994 0.803 
 
            
Leaning-against-the-wind 
           
     Purchases 49 8 16.3 2,190 257 11.7 0.031 0.979 1.010 0.112 
 
       Sales 44 16 36.4 2,190 278 12.7 0.058 0.985 1.043 0.000 *** 
Panel B: Indonesia 
 
Intervention Virtual 
p1 p2 p1+p2 1-CDF Total Successes Total Successes 
# # % # # % 
General 
           
     Purchases 25 10 40.0 2,311 1,321 57.2 0.008 0.985 0.992 0.938 * 
       Sales 179 117 65.4 2,311 1,440 62.3 0.081 0.929 1.010 0.169 
 
            
Appreciate / Depreciate 
           
     Purchases 25 5 20.0 2,311 1,018 44.1 0.005 0.985 0.989 0.989 ** 
       Sales 179 91 50.8 2,311 1,177 50.9 0.077 0.922 1.000 0.479 
 
            
Leaning-against-the-wind 
           
     Purchases 25 5 20.0 2,311 253 10.9 0.020 0.990 1.010 0.048 ** 
       Sales 179 23 12.8 2,311 213 9.2 0.108 0.926 1.034 0.034 ** 
Panel C: Malaysia 
 
Intervention Virtual 
p1 p2 p1+p2 1-CDF Total Successes Total Successes 
# # % # # % 
General 















     Purchases 26 17 65.4 2,310 1,358 58.8 0.013 0.991 1.003 0.188 
 
       Sales 12 10 83.3 2,310 1,390 60.2 0.007 0.998 1.005 0.020 ** 
            
Appreciate / Depreciate 
           
     Purchases 26 7 26.9 2,310 1,005 43.5 0.007 0.985 0.992 0.938 * 
       Sales 12 6 50.0 2,310 1,089 47.1 0.006 0.995 1.001 0.312 
 
            
Leaning-against-the-wind 
           
     Purchases 26 10 38.5 2,310 314 13.6 0.032 0.992 1.024 0.000 *** 
       Sales 12 3 25.0 2,310 268 11.6 0.011 0.996 1.007 0.041 * 
Panel D: Philippines 
 
Intervention Virtual 
p1 p2 p1+p2 1-CDF Total Successes Total Successes 
# # % # # % 
General 
           
     Purchases 71 47 66.2 2,310 1,421 61.5 0.033 0.973 1.006 0.172 
 
       Sales 49 31 63.3 2,310 1,496 64.8 0.021 0.978 0.999 0.534 
 
            
Appreciate / Depreciate 
           
     Purchases 71 23 32.4 2,310 1,027 44.5 0.022 0.963 0.985 0.976 ** 
       Sales 49 19 38.8 2,310 1,225 53.0 0.016 0.972 0.988 0.970 ** 
            
Leaning-against-the-wind 
           
     Purchases 71 24 33.8 2,310 353 15.3 0.068 0.976 1.044 0.000 *** 
       Sales 49 11 22.4 2,310 256 11.1 0.043 0.981 1.024 0.006 *** 
Panel E: Singapore 
 
Intervention Virtual 
p1 p2 p1+p2 1-CDF Total Successes Total Successes 
# # % # # % 
General 
           
     Purchases 36 25 69.4 2,308 1,464 63.4 0.017 0.987 1.004 0.177 
 
       Sales 7 6 85.7 2,308 1,512 65.5 0.004 0.999 1.003 0.052 * 
            
Appreciate / Depreciate 
           
     Purchases 36 10 27.8 2,308 1,045 45.3 0.010 0.979 0.989 0.976 ** 
       Sales 7 4 57.1 2,308 1,230 53.3 0.003 0.997 1.000 0.284 
 
            
Leaning-against-the-wind 
           
     Purchases 36 15 41.7 2,308 396 17.2 0.038 0.989 1.027 0.000 *** 
       Sales 7 2 28.6 2,308 272 11.8 0.007 0.998 1.005 0.039 ** 
Panel F: South Korea 
 
Intervention Virtual 
p1 p2 p1+p2 1-CDF Total Successes Total Successes 
# # % # # % 
General 
           
     Purchases 113 77 68.1 2,306 1,479 64.1 0.052 0.956 1.009 0.156 
 
       Sales 69 42 60.9 2,306 1,423 61.7 0.030 0.969 0.999 0.512 
 
            
Appreciate / Depreciate 
           















       Sales 69 34 49.3 2,306 1,153 50.0 0.029 0.970 0.999 0.500 
 
            
Leaning-against-the-wind 
           
     Purchases 113 35 31.0 2,306 335 14.5 0.104 0.960 1.065 0.000 *** 
       Sales 69 8 11.6 2,306 261 11.3 0.031 0.970 1.001 0.378 
 
Panel G: Taiwan 
 
Intervention Virtual 
p1 p2 p1+p2 1-CDF Total Successes Total Successes 
# # % # # % 
General 
           
     Purchases 221 18 53.4 2,256 1,326 58.8 0.089 0.889 0.978 0.949 * 
       Sales 40 25 62.5 2,256 1,531 67.9 0.016 0.979 0.996 0.717 
 
            
Appreciate / Depreciate 
           
     Purchases 221 74 33.5 2,256 996 44.1 0.074 0.883 0.958 1.000 *** 
       Sales 40 14 35.0 2,256 1,224 54.3 0.011 0.975 0.986 0.989 ** 
            
Leaning-against-the-wind 
           
     Purchases 221 40 18.1 2,256 310 13.7 0.129 0.907 1.036 0.021 ** 
       Sales 40 11 27.5 2,256 291 12.9 0.038 0.985 1.023 0.003 *** 
Panel H: Thailand 
 
Intervention Virtual 
p1 p2 p1+p2 1-CDF Total Successes Total Successes 
# # % # # % 
General 
           
     Purchases 93 62 66.7 2,308 1,450 62.8 0.043 0.964 1.007 0.187 
 
       Sales 23 16 69.6 2,308 1,454 63.0 0.011 0.992 1.003 0.193 
 
            
Appreciate / Depreciate 
           
     Purchases 93 26 28.0 2,308 1,098 47.6 0.024 0.945 0.968 1.000 *** 
       Sales 23 8 34.8 2,308 1,139 49.4 0.007 0.987 0.994 0.884 
 
            
Leaning-against-the-wind 
           
     Purchases 93 34 36.6 2,308 317 13.7 0.107 0.970 1.078 0.000 *** 


















Table 3 Results of Asian Countries’ Intervention Reaction Functions Using 
Firm News Category 
We estimate the intervention function using Heckman’ s (1979) two-step approach:  
9∗ = a>? +MOVAG< × a>" + SIG< × a>G + J                         (9) 
H = $>? + ∆ ×	$>" + K                                    (10) 
Equation (9) is a probit model for the decision to intervene. MOVAG is the ten-day moving 
average of the 9:00 a.m. exchange rates. SIG is the ten-day rolling standard eviation of the 
9:00 a.m. exchange rates in equation (10) that the number of intervention news. ∆ is 
the opening exchange rate of day t minus the opening exchange rate of day t-1. The sample 
period is from January 2005 to November 2013. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *,**, 





















































































































































Table 4 The Effects of Individual Variables on the Odds Ratio Using Firm News 
Category 
NEWSHAT is the number of reports after adjusting for sample selection bias. COUN is the number of 
countries jointly intervening on the same day. FIRS is a dummy variable that equals one when a firm 
report on intervention on day t is the first intervention day in the past five business days. SUPP is a 
dummy variable that equals one when there is an official statement supporting interventions in Reuters’ 
news reports. NEUT is a dummy variable that equals one when there is an official announcement of 
neutral reports. Announcement days refer to announcements on the repurchase rate (RR), interest rate 
(IR), interbank overnight rate (IOR), gross domestic product (GDP), consumer price index (CPI), 
balance of trade (BOT), and current account balance (CAB). The LR test is the likelihood ratio test for 
the null that all the coefficients of the covariates other than the intercept are equal to zero. The sample 
period is from January 2005 to November 2013. *,**, and *** denotes significance at the 90%, 95%, 
and 99% confidence levels, respectively. To conserve space, results for the macroeconomic 
announcements as control variables are not reported here. 
 (A) India Coefficient t-statistic  Intercept t-statistic LR test 
Intervention Variables 
      
 NEWSHAT 6.511 7.580 ***  -13.455 -9.810 58.960 
 COUN 1.114 11.070 ***  -4.679 -21.540 122.230 
 FIRS 4.538 10.810 ***  -3.897 -25.300 104.840 
 SUPP 2.734 3.890 ***  -3.582 -27.140 9.690 
 NEUT 2.858 2.320 **  -3.551 -27.340 3.440 
(B) Indonesia       
 NEWSHAT 4.76e-08 4.550 ***  -3.062 -28.180 17.110 
 COUN 1.057 13.130 ***  -3.777 -26.280 178.390 
 FIRS 3.385 12.620 ***  -3.175 -29.510 136.370 
 SUPP 1.959 5.100 ***  -2.914 -30.700 18.970 
 NEUT 1.765 2.620 ***  -2.864 -31.020 4.970 
(C) Malaysia       
 NEWSHAT 17.157 4.090 ***  -25.625 -4.820 30.270 
 COUN 1.322 9.250 ***  -6.147 -15.690 91.020 
 FIRS 5.427 10.340 ***  -5.021 -19.380 86.260 
(D) Philippines       
 NEWSHAT 0.048 0.190 
 
-3.416 -9.710 0.040 
 COUN 1.374 13.110 ***  -4.888 -21.590 209.700 
 FIRS 5.023 15.090 ***  -4.119 -24.520 241.830 
 SUPP 2.709 4.340 ***  -3.403 -28.790 12.550 
(E) Singapore       
 NEWSHAT 6.571 5.240 ***  -11.341 -7.950 25.230 
 COUN 1.358 9.770 ***  -6.058 -16.190 106.600 
 FIRS 6.245 12.100 ***  -5.329 -17.630 155.990 
(F) South Korea        
 NEWSHAT 5.05e-03 4.570 *** -3.109 -28.610 16.640 
 COUN 1.496 15.160 *** -4.494 -23.550 311.010 
 FIRS 3.586 12.240 *** -3.225 -29.330 131.220 
 SUPP 2.179 7.480 *** -3.063 -29.940 41.28 
 NEUT 1.464 2.260 ** -2.930 -30.750 3.760 
(G) Taiwan       
 NEWSHAT 9.209 4.220 *** -13.136 -5.280 17.420 
 COUN 1.063 13.480 *** -3.611 -26.650 192.350 
 FIRS 3.532 13.480 *** -3.057 -29.580 168.610 
 SUPP 2.647 5.660 *** -2.753 -30.900 25.130 
 NEUT 2.495 3.690 *** -2.719 -31.040 10.440 
(H) Thailand         
 NEWSHAT 0.497 0.270 
 















 COUN 1.341 13.000 *** -4.830 -21.800 201.490 
 FIRS 4.737 13.720 *** -3.918 -25.740 187.650 
 SUPP 3.046 8.130 *** -3.525 -28.010 46.270 

















Table 5 Joint Significance of Variables on the Odds Ratio Using Firm News 
Category 
We use the logit regression to predict the success of central bank intervention: 
,-. =	 ln 1 2-3"!2-34 = 	5.'- + 7., where iX  is a (1×K) vector of variables, which include NEWSHAT, 
COUN, FIRS, SUPP, and NEUT. NEWSHAT is the number of reports after adjusting for sample 
selection bias. COUN is the number of countries jointly intervening on the same day. FIRS is a dummy 
variable that equals one when a firm report on intervention on day t is the first intervention day in the 
past five business days. SUPP is a dummy variable that equals one when there is an official statement 
supporting interventions in Reuters’ news reports. NEUT is a dummy variable that equals one when 
there is an official announcement of neutral reports. The LR test is the likelihood ratio test for thenull 
that all the coefficients of the covariates other than the intercept are all equal to zero. LR test1 i the 
likelihood ratio test statistic that compares the log ikelihood function with only an intercept in the 
covariate to that of a regression that includes a constant and covariates. The term ‘plus’ implies that the 
variable is added to the existing list of regressor in the logit regression. LR test2 is the likelihood ratio 
test statistic for the null that the benchmark regression contains the covariates in the same row as ‘–‘. 
The sample period is from January 2005 to November 2013. *,**, and *** denote significance at the 
90%, 95%, and 99% confidence levels, respectively. 
Panel A: India 
   Log Likelihood LR test1  LR test2   
(1) NEWSHAT -252.60 58.96 ***  - 
 
plus COUN -207.47 149.23 ***  90.27 ***  
plus FIRS -206.31 151.55 ***  92.59 ***  
plus SUPP -249.10 65.97 ***  7.01 * 
plus NEUT -251.44 61.30 ***  2.33 
 
(2) NEWSHAT, FIRS -206.31 151.55 ***  - 
 
plus COUN -175.83 212.52 ***  60.97 ***  
plus SUPP -201.83 160.51 ***  8.96 ** 
plus NEUT -204.82 154.53 ***  2.97 * 
(3) NEWSHAT, FIRS, COUN -175.83 212.52 ***  - 
 
plus SUPP -170.90 222.38 ***  9.86 ***  
plus NEUT -175.37 213.43 ***  0.9 
 
(4) NEWSHAT, FIRS, SUPP -170.90 222.38 ***  - 
 
plus NEUT -170.41 223.35 ***  0.98   
Panel B: Indonesia 
   Log Likelihood LR test1  LR test2   
(1) FIRS -423.66 136.37 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -413.82 156.05 ***  19.68 ***  
plus COUN -366.65 250.39 ***  114.02 ***  
plus SUPP -416.68 150.34 ***  13.97 ***  
plus NEUT -420.36 142.98 ***  6.61 ** 
plus IR -422.25 139.19 ***  2.83 * 
(2) FIRS, COUN -366.65 250.39 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -360.84 262.02 ***  11.63 ***  
plus SUPP -363.42 256.85 ***  6.46 ** 
plus NEUT -365.54 252.62 ***  2.23 
 
plus IR -365.38 252.94 ***  2.55 
 
(3) FIRS, COUN, NEWSHAT -360.84 262.02 ***  - 
 
plus SUPP -357.86 267.98 ***  5.96 ** 
















plus IR -359.42 264.86 ***  0.99 * 
(4) FIRS, COUN, NEWSHAT -357.86 267.98 ***  - 
 
plus NEUT -357.28113 269.13 ***  1.15 
 
plus IR -356.63726 270.42 ***  2.44   
Panel C: Malaysia 
   Log Likelihood LR test1  LR test2   
(1) NEWSHAT -131.82 30.27 ***  - 
 
plus COUN -92.29 109.33 ***  79.07 ***  
plus FIRS -95.89 102.13 ***  71.86 ***  
(2) NEWSHAT, COUN -92.29 109.33 ***  - 
 
plus FIRS -74.30 145.31 ***  35.98 ***  
(3) NEWSHAT, COUN, FIRS -74.30 145.31 ***  -   
Panel D: Philippines 
  Log Likelihood LR test1  LR test2   
(1) FIRS -220.00 241.83 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -219.62 242.61 ***  0.77 
 
plus COUN -169.08 343.69 ***  101.86 ***  
plus SUPP -217.97 245.91 ***  4.08 ** 
(2) FIRS, COUN -169.08 343.69 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -167.59 346.67 ***  2.98 * 
plus SUPP -168.55 344.74 ***  1.05 
 
(3) FIRS, COUN, NEWSHAT -167.59 346.67 ***  - 
 
plus SUPP -167.17 347.51 ***  0.84  
Panel E: Singapore 
  Log Likelihood LR test1  LR test2   
(1) NEWSHAT 6.57 25.23 ***  - 
 
plus COUN -101.29 126.21 ***  100.97 ***  
plus FIRS -78.71 171.37 ***  146.14 ***  
(2) NEWSHAT, FIRS -78.71 171.37 ***  - 
 
plus COUN -54.41 219.96 ***  48.60 ***  
(3) NEWSHAT, FIRS, COUN -54.41 219.96 ***  -   
Panel F: South Korea 
   Log Likelihood LR test1  LR test2  
(1) FIRS -402.95 131.22 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -395.46 146.19 ***  14.98 ***  
plus COUN -284.41 368.29 ***  237.08 ***  
plus SUPP -392.58 151.95 ***  20.73 ***  
plus NEUT -402.73 131.66 ***  0.44 
 
(2) FIRS, COUN -284.41 368.29 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSH T -282.04 373.02 ***  4.73 ** 
plus SUPP -282.01 373.09 ***  4.79 ** 
plus NEUT -284.33 368.45 ***  0.15 
 
(3) FIRS, COUN, SUPP -282.01 373.09 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -279.48 378.15 ***  5.06 ** 
plus NEUT -281.95 373.22 ***  0.13 
 
(4) FIRS, COUN, SUPP, NEWSHAT -279.48 378.15 ***  - 
 















Panel G: Taiwan 
   Log Likelihood LR test 1  LR test 2   
(1) NEWSHAT -524.06 17.42 ***  - 
 
plus COUN -425.02 215.50 ***  198.08 ***  
plus FIRS -439.81 185.91 ***  168.49 ***  
plus SUPP -513.47 38.60 ***  21.18 ***  
plus NEUT -519.08 27.39 ***  9.97 ***  
(2) NEWSHAT, COUN -425.02 215.50 ***  - 
 
plus FIRS -371.13 323.28 ***  107.78 ***  
plus SUPP -418.22 229.10 ***  13.60 ***  
plus NEUT -423.77 217.99 ***  2.49 
 
(3) NEWSHAT, COUN, FIRS -371.13 323.28 ***  - 
 
plus SUPP -364.16 337.22 ***  13.94 ***  
plus NEUT -370.47 324.60 ***  1.32 
 
(4) NEWSHAT, COUN, FIRS, SUPP -364.16 337.22 ***  - 
 
plus NEUT -363.41 338.71 ***  1.49  
Panel H: Thailand 
   Log Likelihood LR test1  LR test2   
(1) FIRS -247.02 187.65 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -247.01 187.68 ***  0.02 
 
plus COUN -189.63 302.44 ***  114.79 ***  
plus SUPP -238.44 204.82 ***  17.16 ***  
plus NEUT -241.60 198.50 ***  10.84 ***  
(2) FIRS, COUN -189.63 302.44 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -187.48 306.75 ***  4.31 ** 
plus SUPP -184.98 311.75 ***  9.31 ***  
plus NEUT -184.99 311.72 ***  9.28 ***  
(3) FIRS, COUN, SUPP -184.98 311.75 ***  - 
 
plus NEWSHAT -182.78 316.14 ***  4.39 ** 
plus NEUT -179.98 321.74 ***  9.99 ***  
(4) FIRS, COUN, SUPP, NEUT -179.98 321.74 ***  - 
 


















Table A1  Sample News Reports 
We classify news reports into four categories: firm, suspected, support, and neutral. The firm news 
category refers to news that clearly indicate that e central bank intervened in currency markets. The
suspected news category is for news that cast doubt n official foreign exchange intervention. The 
supported news category is for news that indicate that central bank or government officials provided a 
statement of support for intervention in the foreign exchange market. The neutral news category is for 
news that indicates central bankers or government officials provided a neutral opinion on foreign 
exchange intervention activities. The column heading of ‘Actions’ represents buying or selling of US 
dollars, or no clear intervention strategy. The examples of news content are obtained from Indonesia’ s 
reports. 





The central bank was spotted buying dollars, initially from 8,600 up to 
8,610, but pulled back its intervention lines. 
It is stuck because the central bank keeps intervening to support 
USD/IDR, so it doesn't break the 8,705 level. 






Traders said they suspected authorities were intervening to buy dollars 
on Thursday at levels around 9,288 to 9,290 to smooth currency 
volatility. 
 Traders suspect Bank Indonesia intervened again to curb rupiah strength. 
The Indonesian rupiah hovered near 9,870-9,880 per dollar as the central 
bank was suspectedly selling dollars in the market to prop up the 
weakening currency, traders said. 
Supported No 
“We have already studied it very carefully, knowing which are the 
aggressive players. We know the players,” Nasution said, adding "BI is 
in the market to prevent excessive volatility in the market."--Bank 
Indonesia's (BI) senior deputy governor, Darmin Nasution 
Central bank governor Boediono said the bank will remain in the market 
to support the rupiah. 
 Indonesia's central bank will not let the rupiah hit "irrational" levels, 
Bank Indonesia's governor said on Tuesday, following a further 
depreciation of the currency. 
Neutral No 
Budi Mulya, a deputy governor of Bank Indonesia (BI), told Reuters that 
the central bank would not curb strengthening in the rupiah as it reflects 
investor optimism on the country’ s economic fundamentals. 
 The rupiah rebounded to 10,800 per dollar to be virtually unchanged 
from Monday’ s close after President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said 
authorities may announce a new policy response to the currency’ s fall. 
He didn’ t provide any details. 
 The rupiah was “still within fundamental range” despite its recent gains, 














      Highlights 
 
1. We test the odds of intervention success by Asian central banks in FX market. 
2. Results show that leaning-against-the-wind intervention strategies are effective. 
3. Joint and first day interventions also increase the odds of intervention success. 
 
